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Indivisible Injury Negligence and Nuisance Cases -
Proving Causation Among Multiple-Source Polluters:
A State-by-State Survey of the Law for New England, and
a Proposal for a New Causation Framework
PAUL HOMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The skies, soil, and water of every state are polluted every day.
Whether the pollutants enter the atmosphere from coal plants or the water-
ways from large farms, materials abnormal to the "natural" environment
are regularly emitted by a variety of sources over wide regions of the na-
tion. To some extent, such emissions are normal and acceptable activities
in modem society.
At times, however, the discharges from energy production plants, cars,
factories, and other sources cumulate to damage not only the appearance or
condition of our natural resources, but also the conditions of our health,
economy, and society at large.' While the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") has traditionally served as a watchdog of polluters and a
protector of citizens, assuring that air, water, and soil quality improve
through gradually increasing standards, there are other available methods
of protection. Some states have taken a more active role in protecting their
environments, most recently because the EPA under the Bush Administra-
tion has modified environmental regulations in ways that some assert are
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Franklin Pierce Law Center - Concord, NH; MM, 1999, New England
Conservatory of Music - Boston, MA; BA, 1991, The Pennsylvania State University - University Park,
PA. I would like to thank the following Pierce Law Review editors for their assistance with this article:
Stephen Chan, Scott Lowry, Matt Poison, Doug Edmunds, Mia Poliquin, Brian Moyer, and Alison
Bethel. I would also like to thank Professor Mitch Simon for his feedback throughout the writing
process, and the former Pierce Law Review advisor, Professor Chris Johnson.
1. See e.g. William Booth, Study: Pollution May Cause Asthma; Illness Affects 9 Million U.S.
Children, Wash. Post A02 (Feb. 1, 2002) (causally linking polluted air to asthma cases); Amanda Sue
Niskar et al., Estimated Prevalence of Noise-Induced Hearing Threshold Shifts Among Children 6-19
Years ofAge: The Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 1988-1994, United States,
108 Pediatrics 40, 40-41 (2001) (estimating 12.5% of U.S. children suffer hearing loss in one or both
ears from continued exposure to excessive noise); U.S. Envtl. Protec. Agency, About Air Toxics,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/allabout.html (accessed Sept. 3, 2004) (providing information on health
and environmental effects of toxic air pollutants throughout the United States).
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detrimental to citizens.2 In addition to state actions by Attorneys General,
citizens and corporations have the right to protect their health and envi-
ronments through lawsuits when polluters damage their personal health,
safety, or environment through negligence or nuisance. 3  That right be-
comes more tenuous, however, as the number of polluters increases.
If a person develops asthma through exposure to pollutants emitted by
several (or a dozen) power producers, should the producers be liable for
that person's illness? Even if the emissions of one power producer alone
would not have been enough to cause the asthma? Even if one of the pro-
ducers only created a small fraction of the total amount of pollution that
eventually caused the physical harm?
More generally, if an individual develops a health condition from ex-
posure to emissions or discharges that come from a variety of similar
sources, whether from multiple power plants, farms or manufacturers,
should all the contributors be held liable for the harm? Is it legally valid in
a negligence or nuisance suit to hold that one of many producers caused
the harm, though that single producer may only have contributed a small
portion of the harm-causing pollutant? At present, the answers vary by
jurisdiction.
The purpose of this paper is to survey the law of causation in the New
England States as it relates to negligence and nuisance claims in which
multiple-tortfeasors act to produce a single, indivisible harm.4  Specifi-
cally, when the cumulative effects of multiple-source polluters cause an
individual to suffer harm, can the causation element in a negligence or
nuisance claim be satisfied through their collective contributions, though
individually each may add only a small percentage to the total output? If
not, it is time for New England courts to reconsider causation in the con-
text of multiple source pollution.
As the discussion and cases below clarify, New England courts have
generally either rejected theories that loosen causation requirements, or not
addressed them at all, at least as they relate to multiple-source polluters.
Considering the widespread effects of pollutants on our health, communi-
2. See e.g. Christopher Drew & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., How Power Lobby Won the Battle of Pollu-
tion Control at E.P.A., N.Y. Times Al (Mar. 6, 2004) (discussing changes in EPA policies in the last
several years that benefit power producers by reducing pollution controls); Ten States Ask EPA To
Scrap Draft Mercury Emissions Rule, Dow Jones Intl. News (Apr. 1, 2004).
3. See e.g. D & WJones, Inc. v. Collier, 372 So. 2d 288, 288, 294 (Miss. 1979) (allowing a corpo-
ration to file suit against a group of farmers for damages resulting from agricultural chemicals that
spread to the corporation's fish population, contaminating or killing the fish).
4. There are a number of complicating factors that may be relevant to such litigation that this paper
will not consider. Examples include state cut-off points for comparative negligence claims, jurisdic-
tional issues between states, Clean Air Act provisions, legally accepted methods of tracking and meas-
uring pollutants, state statutes that may protect certain industries, etc.
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ties, and environments, in combination with a federal government that may
be either unwilling, or unable, to protect citizens through regulations or
litigation, state courts should rethink traditional causation requirements to
allow such litigation. If they fail to do so, they tacitly endorse a system
that burdens the innocent plaintiff rather than the tortious defendant.
II. PROVING CAUSATION AMONG MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS -
BACKGROUND
Traditionally, litigators proved causation in negligence and nuisance
claims utilizing the "but for" concept: "but for" the individual defendant's
action, the plaintiff would not have been harmed.5 Later, courts expanded
the concept, allowing plaintiffs to prove causation if the defendant's action
was a "substantial factor" in the plaintiffs resulting harm. 6 Any plaintiff
using either of these concepts would fail to satisfy the causation element
given the scenario above; both concepts require at least substantial input on
the part of the individual producer.7 In cases where the actions of multiple
polluters have combined to produce a single detrimental effect, it may be
difficult if not impossible to prove that any one of the producers individu-
ally caused the alleged damages.
Many courts later recognized that injustice could result when multiple
tortfeasors caused a single, indivisible harm, but the party harmed was
incapable of proving exactly which of the tortfeasors caused the injury and
to what degree. Alternative liability arose as a theory from the landmark
case of Summers v. Tice, where it was impossible to determine which of
two quail hunters negligently hit a third hunter when they simultaneously
shot their guns in the direction of the third hunter.8 The court held that
when (1) two or more parties act in concert to cause a single injury; and (2)
all responsible parties are present at trial; and (3) they have greater knowl-
edge than the plaintiff concerning who committed the tortious act causing
the harm, the defendants should be held jointly and severally liable for the
damage, thus shifting the burden of apportioning fault to the defendants. 9
5. See e.g. N.Y. C. R.R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920); Sowles v. Moore, 26 A.
629, 630 (Vt. 1893).
6. See e.g. Dominick Vetri et al., Tort Law and Practice 416-17 (2d ed., LexisNexis 2002) (refer-
encing also Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 251-52 (1902), which found it impossible to determine
which cyclist was "more" responsible when the cyclists simultaneously passed on either side of a
carriage, spooking the horses and causing damage, but it was clear that their combined actions caused
the damage).
7. Id. at416.
8. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 1-2 (Cal. 1948) (holding that causation in the alternative was
sufficient to prove causation since only one of the actors caused the harm, not both).
9. Id. at 4-5.
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Courts further expanded methods to prove causation among multiple
tortfeasors through the creation of market share liability for cases where
the plaintiff could not determine which manufacturer, among several, pro-
duced the product that caused the harm.'0 To apply market share liability,
courts held that (1) multiple defendants had to (2) produce identical prod-
ucts in a parallel manner to (3) cause identical injuries which came about
(4) latently because of some characteristic of the product."
Additionally, courts relaxed causation requirements in "toxic torts"' 2
cases by applying the enterprise theory of liability when multiple producers
create nearly identical products and one of those products harms a plaintiff,
but it is impossible to determine the source of the harm. 13 A hybrid of al-
ternative liability and concert of action tort theories, 14 enterprise liability
effectively shifts the burden of proof to the defendants, requiring them to
exonerate themselves in cases where all the potentially responsible parties
engaged in the hazardous group activity are joined as defendants. 15 When
the injury cannot be clearly traced to one defendant, enterprise liability
places responsibility on the industry as a whole so long as the following
seven elements are met:
(1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative
agent and such inability is due to the nature of the defendants' con-
duct.
(2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by
all the defendants.
(3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
(4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which the plaintiff
was a member.
10. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1071-72 (N.Y. 1989) (Manufacturers are held
liable based not on the number of their own pills the plaintiff took, for example, but rather on the com-
pany's "market share" of business in the product, either nationally or in some other, smaller market.).
11. Id. at 1075. The court additionally required that for the market share theory to apply, the legisla-
ture must also have acted to specially allow litigation against the tortfeasors, though the statute of
limitations may have passed, since the damaging effects of DES invariably took some time to appear.
Holding such strict requirements for its application has limited the application of market share liability
to relatively few cases, including primarily drug cases such as DES. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, The
Law of Torts § 176 (West 2000).
12. "Injury caused by a toxic substance for which a lawsuit can be brought for damages under strict
liability or negligence theories." Modern Dictionary for the Legal Profession (3d ed., William S. Hein
& Co., Inc. 2001).
13. Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 3:9 (West 2003).
14. Concert of action theories require that plaintiffs "prove (1) parallel conduct or assistance; and (2)
knowing participation in such conduct on the part of each defendant in accordance with some agree-
ment or plan." Id. at § 3:7. Such a theory is of limited use in the multiple polluter context.
15. Id. at § 3:9.
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(5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiffs injury
was caused by the product of some one of the defendants. For ex-
ample, the joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of
such defective products on the market at the time of plaintiffs in-
jury.
(6) There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of safety
as to the manufacture of this product.
(7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of
whichever cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or
strict liability.
16
This theory posits that industry actors who willingly engage in activi-
ties that involve inherent dangers to society should be responsible for any
harmful consequences. 17 To shift the burden to the defendants, the plaintiff
must "prove joint awareness of the risks and joint capacity to reduce
them."'
18
Finally, some courts further relaxed traditional causation requirements
by applying aspects of joint and several, alternative, and market share li-
ability concepts to negligence and nuisance claims where multiple, unco-
ordinated parties act either simultaneously or successively to create condi-
tions that cause a single, indivisible harm.'
9
III. SURVEYING INDIVISIBLE INJURY AND CAUSATION LAW
The Restatement (Second) of Torts illustrates some of the complexities
present in multiple tortfeasor, indivisible injury tort law as it relates to cau-
sation. Section 433 states that to determine whether a defendant's actions
were a "substantial factor" in causing harm, courts should consider (1) the
number of other factors that contributed to produce the harm; (2) whether
the actor's conduct continuously operated to cause the harm, or merely
16. Id. (quoting Naomi Sheiner, Student Author, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liabil-
ity, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 963, 995 (1978)).
17. Id; see e.g. Hall v. E. L Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353, 359-60, 371-74,
378 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding that six manufacturers may be held jointly liable for defective blasting
caps that injured children when the plaintiffs were unable to identify the particular manufacturer, but
were able to show that each defendant manufactured the caps in the same way, all were similarly defec-
tive, and the industry shared a common safety standard).
18. Cetrulo, supra n. 13, at § 3:9 (citing Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378-79).
19. See e.g. Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 215-17 (6th Cir. 1974) (indicating
multiple-source polluters may be held jointly and severally liable for an indivisible injury caused by
their joint emissions); Collier, 372 So. 2d at 288, 294 (holding that multiple defendants, acting inde-
pendently, may be liable for indivisible injury when separately polluting ponds and contaminating
plaintiff's wildlife). For a more complete discussion of Michie, see infra part IV(A)(1).
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created a harmless situation until acted upon by another party or force; and
(3) how much time had lapsed between the action and harm to the plain-
tiff.20 Additionally, a negligent actor may be prevented from contributing a
"substantial" amount of causation where factors, not within the control of
the actor, "dilute" the effects of the negligence.21 Sections 433A and 433B
further specify that when multiple tortfeasors concurrently act to produce a
single, indivisible harm, each actor can be held liable for the entire injury
and it is not essential that all liable parties be joined as defendants.22 Many
courts have made the policy decision that it is better to burden the defen-
dant who committed some degree to tortious act than the innocent plain-
tiff.2
3
For pollution cases, Dobbs points out in The Law of Torts that there are
several different theories that may satisfy causation in instances where a
group of polluters collectively cause harm, but otherwise would not cause
harm individually.24 Depending upon the facts and the jurisdiction, these
include (1) the substantial factor test; (2) the indivisible injury rule; and (3)
a "but-for" test that finds causation if the sum of the pollution contributes
to cause the harm, and any one polluter could have avoided the harm by
not polluting.25
Any survey of the common law of indivisible injury and multiple pol-
luter cases is fraught with difficulties and complications. In examining the
language of holdings, it is often difficult to separate the concepts of dam-
ages and causation in multiple tortfeasor, indivisible injury negligence and
nuisance claims. 26 The concepts of indivisible injury and fault can inti-
mately intermingle, making it difficult to discern whether a court is dis-
cussing them as related to causation, damages, or both.27 Also, cases that
may seem most parallel to pollution cases in terms of the number of poten-
tial producers, or the nature of the harm caused, often fail to fit neatly into
one of the theories above, such as market share liability or alternative li-
ability. The courts have generally not applied these limited theories to
multiple tortfeasor pollution cases, as is discussed below.
20. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433 (1965).
21. Id. at cmt. d.
22. Here, the burden falls on the defendant to prove that the harm can be apportioned. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 433A cmt. i; 433B cmt. c, cmt. d.
23. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B cmt. d.
24. Dobbs, The Law of Torts at § 171.
25. Id. Dobbs also notes that by statute, a number of people may be liable for releasing hazardous
materials. See e.g. 42 U.S.C.S. § 9607 (2004) (citing the Superfund statute).
26. See e.g. Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 434-35 (Alaska 1979).
27. See e.g. Bobrow/Thomas & Assocs. v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1654, 1662-63 (1996).
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IV. MULTIPLE TORTFEASOR, INDIVISIBLE INJURY CAUSATION LAW:
A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
What follows is a common law analysis of indivisible injury and mul-
tiple tortfeasor cases organized alphabetically by New England state juris-
dictions. The cases presented were selected for either (1) their factual
similarity to the hypothetical scenario above, involving multiple tortfea-
sors, contributing in various degrees to an indivisible injury; (2) language
in the courts' decisions that most clearly indicates their approach to the
issue; or (3) ideally, both of the above.
As the following analysis will clarify, no New England state has yet
expressly liberalized their causation requirements in multiple-tortfeasor
pollution cases, and few have faced the issue at all. Because of the absence
of such language and case law in New England, this analysis contains in-
formation that would otherwise not be considered "on point." First, it be-
gins with examples of case law from Michigan and Texas. Obviously nei-
ther qualifies as a traditional New England state. They are included to
serve as models to indicate what kind of language courts use when they
choose to liberalize causation requirements for multiple polluter scenarios.
The New England state analyses follow directly behind them.
Additionally, the New England state analyses include information con-
cerning alternative, product, enterprise, and market share liability theories
that if strictly applied would probably not fit the multiple source polluter
scenarios represented above. They are included, however, for two reasons:
(1) since there is often no analogous case law addressing the topic directly
on point, these are the most closely related causation issues available; and
(2) they may be used to indicate the state courts' willingness to accept or
reject novel legal theories when presented with novel problems. Finally,
because many courts have not addressed this novel issue, many of the fol-
lowing cases contain factual scenarios completely unrelated to questions of
multiple source pollution, but are nonetheless used to clarify each States'
approach to causation in the absence of analogous facts and case law.
A. Michigan and Texas
1. Michigan
Michigan relaxes standards of proof for plaintiffs in cases involving
multiple polluters and tortfeasors, either if the producers' harm-causing
products are extremely similar, or if they work together to create one indi-
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visible harm.28 In Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, a number of Ca-
nadian citizens sued seven U.S. plants for nuisance because their property
was allegedly damaged by a culmination of toxic air emissions. 2' The
court held that, as a matter of policy and law, it would not be fair to burden
the innocent plaintiff with the "impossible burden of proving the specific
shares of harm done by each., 30 Even though there was no "concert of
action" between the polluting tortfeasors, their cumulative effects caused a
single, indivisible injury that would not have resulted but for the concur-
rence of the acts, therefore the court held that the defendants could be held
jointly liable.31 Oakwood Homeowners Assn. v. Ford Motor Co. reaf-
firmed Michie when a group sued four industrial companies, ranging from
an auto plant to a salt extraction mine, for negligence, arguing that the de-
fendants' emissions interacted "synergistically" to damage the plaintiffs'
property. 32 The court held that so long as the group could show general
liability, the burden fell on the defendants to establish the degree of dam-
age attributable to their particular emissions.33 In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
the children of mothers who had ingested identical and sometimes indistin-
guishable diethylstilbestrol ("DES") products from several companies,
sued when they later suffered from vaginal cancer or legions from the DES
exposure.34 Again, interpreting the law generously for plaintiffs, the court
decided to adopt alternative liability in cases such as this, where "all de-
fendants have acted tortiously, but only one unidentifiable defendant
caused the plaintiffs injury., 35 The plaintiff must make a genuine attempt
to identify and bring every possible defendant into court and establish the
other elements of the underlying cause of action, but is not required to
bring all parties to court.36 If this is done, Michigan courts shift the burden
of causation in fact to the defendants, forcing them to exonerate themselves
by a preponderance of facts, or be held jointly and severally liable.37
Because Michigan does not require that polluters act in concert, be-
cause the Michigan Supreme Court has expressly stated a preference to
burden defendants rather than plaintiffs in multiple tortfeasor pollution and
28. Michie, 495 F.2d at 218; Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Mich. 1984); Oakwood
Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 77 Mich. App. 197, 221 (1977).
29. 495 F.2dat215.
30. Id. at 216.
31. Id. at215-16.
32. 77 Mich. App. at 202, 217-21.
33. Id. at 218-19.
34. 343 N.W.2d at 166-67.
35. Id. at 174.
36. Id. at 173. Note that whether or not the defendant has access to evidence of causation is irrele-
vant, unlike the assumed circumstances in Summers, 199 P.2d at 1-2.
37. Id. at 174. This is actually a lesser requirement than in Summers v. Tice, where the plaintiff had
to bring all the potential tortfeasors to court. 199 P.2d at 1-2.
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product liability cases, because it permits plaintiffs to join, in a single ac-
tion, defendant polluters from a variety of industries, and because it applies
alternative liability to DES cases without requiring that plaintiffs join every
possible party to the suit, Michigan may be considered a plaintiff-friendly
state.
2. Texas
Texas has relaxed its causation principles to permit liability in envi-
ronmental cases where the actions of tortfeasors combine to create a harm
in which it is impossible to separate individual responsibility among the
parties.38 In Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., two compa-
nies allowed their pipelines to pollute the plaintiffs lake with salt water
and oil.39 The court held that when several defendants pollute the same
body of water, and the injury could not be apportioned with reasonable
certainty to the individual wrongdoers, all defendants should be held
jointly and severally liable. 40  If the plaintiff failed to join a potential
wrongdoer, the joint defendants could simply bring in those omitted par-
ties.41
In contrast to its decision to expand causation in Landers, in Kramer v.
Lewisville Memorial Hospital the Texas Supreme Court rejected an argu-
ment to adopt the "Loss of Chance" doctrine42 when a hospital's staff
failed to diagnose the decedent's cervical cancer, consequently decreasing
the patient's chance of survival.43 Kramer cited Landers in confirming that
"[t]he only exception we have recognized to our longstanding causation
principles is where the inextricable combination of joint tortfeasors com-
bines to cause harm in a manner where individual responsibility cannot be
fixed." 4  Likewise, Gaulding v. Celotex Corp. confirmed that Landers
represented the court's only variation from traditional causation require-
ments when it refused to adopt either alternative liability or enterprise li-
ability theories for asbestos-manufacturing cases.45 In Gaulding, the chil-
38. Kramer v. Lewisville Meml. Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 405-06 (Tex. 1993); Gaulding v. Celotex
Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Tex. 1989); Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731,
734-35 (Tex. 1952).
39. 248 S.W.2d at 731-32.
40. Id. at 734-35.
41. Id. at 734.
42. For an example of the Loss of Chance doctrine, see e.g. Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of
Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476-78 (Wash. 1983) (holding that a reduction in the probability of a
patient's survival, even if original chance is under 50%, can provide sufficient evidence of causation to
send to a jury to decide whether a Dr.'s actions constituted "proximate cause").
43. 858 S.W.2d at 398-99, 407.
44. Id. at 406.
45. 772 S.W.2d at 69-70.
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dren of a woman who died from exposure to a cabinet containing asbestos
sou ht to impose collective liability upon five possible asbestos produc-
ers. The court insisted that the plaintiffs join all possible defendants to
prove causation when adopting alternative liability.47 Gaulding rejected
enterprise liability theories,48 reasoning that the theories are only applica-
ble to cases involving "five or ten" producers in a centralized industry, not
to cases composed of potentially "thousands" of smaller producers.49
In short, Texas has declined to expand its causation theories to sim-
plify the proof of causation in multiple tortfeasor cases, but it has ex-
panded its theories in cases where the effects of multiple polluters combine
inextricably to create an indivisible harm defying individual responsibility.
Because plaintiffs have a cause of action to prove causation against multi-
ple-source, concurring polluters in Texas, though the plaintiffs may be
unaware of all potentially tortious parties or the amount of damage that
each contributed, Texas must be considered a plaintiff-friendly State.
B. The New England States
1. Connecticut
Connecticut generally requires, in negligence cases, that the plaintiff
prove "but for" causality; that the negligence is "causally linked" to the
harm, and that the defendants' actions were "proximate" to the resulting
injury.5° When a man who worked with asbestos and smoked cigarettes for
thirty years died of lung cancer, Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc.
held that it was reasonable for a jury to find that the defendant's asbestos
products partially caused his death, taking into consideration duration of
employment, selling location, the total quantity of asbestos sold
($130,000), and typical job functions.5' In Zuchowicz v. United States, the
court discussed how other courts have embraced alternative and market
share liability systems, but declined to adopt either theory.5z In its opinion
about a naval hospital that over-prescribed drugs to a woman who conse-
quently contracted a fatal lung condition, the court clarified its "but for"
46. Id. at 67.
47. Id. at 69. This is a "traditional" requirement when applying the Summers v. Tice alternative
liability theory. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 4-5.
48. For elements of enterprise liability, review supra note 16 and accompanying text.
49. 772 S.W.2d at 70.
50. Zuchowicz v. U.S., 140 F.3d 381, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1998); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 562 A.2d 1100, 1112 (Conn. 1989); Doe v. Saracyn Corp., 82 A.2d 811,815 (Conn. 1951).
51. 562 A.2d at 1104, 1112. The court also held that the lower court appropriately considered his
smoking when assigning comparative responsibility to the decedent for his death. Id. at 1121-22.
52. 140 F.3d at 388-91.
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and "causal link" requirements stating "[c]ausal link says that, even if de-
fendant's wrong was a but for cause of the injury in a given case, no liabil-
ity ensues unless defendant's wrong increases the chances of such harm
occurring in general. 53
Doe v. Saracyn illustrates a limited circumstance where Connecticut
courts expanded causation to accommodate plaintiffs harmed by pollutants
that accumulated over time. In Saracyn, the plaintiff suffered from arsenic
poisoning shortly after moving to an apartment, where arsenic had leached
into the well water as a result of a neighboring manufacturing plant's poor
safety practices.54 Though Saracyn affirmed the indivisible injury rule
where concurrent negligent tortfeasors, acting independently, combined to
proximately poison the plaintiff, it specified that the rule should be applied
"even though [one defendant's] act alone might not have caused the entire
injury. 55
Despite using indivisible injury language and contemplating alternative
and market share liability concepts, the above relatively disparate cases
indicate that Connecticut courts probably would require a traditional show-
ing of "but for" to prove causation. The indivisible injury language sug-
gests that a defendant acting alone must cause some injury individually.
Since Champagne only clarifies the court's standards for proving causation
by a single defendant, and Zuchowitz affirms Connecticut's traditional
means of proving causation, it will be difficult for plaintiffs to prove causa-
tion in cases involving multiple polluters.
2. Maine
Maine permits plaintiffs to sue jointly certain defendants who, though
acting independently, cause an indivisible injury. 56 State courts require,
however, that each defendant's individual actions be sufficient to have
caused some injury, and they have yet to apply alternative liability theories
to causation.57 In both Swan v. Andrew Crowe & Sons, Inc. and Kidder v.
Coastal Construction Co., an employee suffered successive, disabling inju-
ries while working for two different employers, but the injuries damaged
the same part of the plaintiff's body and were thus considered indivisible.58
53. Id. at 383, 389.
54. Saracyn, 82 A.2d at 812-13.
55. Id. at 815 (emphasis added).
56. See e.g. Swan v. Andrew Crowe & Sons, Inc., 434 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Me. 1981); Kidder v.
Coastal Constr. Co., 342 A.2d 729, 734 (Me. 1975).
57. Kinnett v. Mass. Gas & Elec. Supply Co., 716 F. Supp. 695, 699-700 (D.N.H. 1989); Swan, 434
A.2d at 1010; Kidder, 342 A.2d at 734; Daigle v. Yesbec, 134 A.2d 548, 549 (Me. 1957); Allison v.
Hobbs, 51 A. 245, 246 (Me. 1901).
58. Swan, 434 A.2d at 1009-10; Kidder, 342 A.2d at 734.
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Since, for example, both injuries in Swan damaged the plaintiffs back, one
could only guess which of the two events necessitated the corrective sur-
gery, and thus each employer was held fifty percent liable for the dam-
ages. 59 The court determined that the indivisible injury rule should apply
to employers only when damages cannot be apportioned.6°
For one hundred years, Maine courts have held that courts should only
apply the indivisible injury rule when the action of each defendant indi-
vidually would have been sufficient to have caused the entire damage.6' In
Allison v. Hobbs, Hobbs was arrested simultaneously on two separate tax
warrants, one of which was illegal.62 The court held that he sustained no
additional injury as a result of the defendant's illegal warrant, since he
could have rightfully been arrested based upon the other, valid warrant.
63
In Kinnett v. Massachusetts Gas & Electric Supply Co., a plaintiff brought
claims against a retailer and three retail suppliers of heat tape when one of
the three suppliers provided faulty tape that caused the plaintiffs house to
burn down.64 Although the plaintiff was unable to identify which supplier
manufactured the tape that had allegedly caused the fire, the Kinnett court
declined to apply alternative liability, since Maine had yet to adopt it.
65
According to the court, adopting the theory of alternative liability would
require that each defendant be negligent, and in this case, only one of the
possible three heat tape manufacturers was potentially at fault.66 Kinnett
noted that alternative liability was appropriate only when the plaintiff was
exposed to each of the defendants' negligences, not just one.67 The court
reasoned that it would apply alternative liability only where the manufac-
turer who caused the harm could not be identified because the effects of
the negligence take time to cause injury, or where science and technology
created products that harmed consumers but could not be traced to specific
producers.68
Considering Maine's adherence to traditional causation rules, its fail-
ure to adopt alternative liability, and its requirement even under indivisible
injury applications that each defendant's actions be sufficient to cause the
whole damage, it is unlikely that the state would support plaintiffs litiga-
tion involving multiple polluters, where each contributed a small portion of
59. 434 A.2d at 1009.
60. Id. at 1010; Kidder, 342 A.2d at 734.
61. Hobbs, 51 A. at 246.
62. Id. at 245-46.
63. Id. at 246.
64. 716 F. Supp. at 696-97.
65. Id. at 698-99.
66. Id
67. Id. at 698.
68. 1d. at 699-700.
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the alleged harming agents. The greatest support for such an application
may come from Kinnett's discussion, determining that alternative liability
appropriately applies in cases of delayed effects, or technological impedi-
ments to tracing producers. But a federal district court applying Maine law
wrote Kinnett, and the weight and value of the discussion, however logical
it may seem, is limited. Additionally, Kinnett considered applying alterna-
tive liability to a case involving only several manufacturers, and thus any
pollution scenario with more than a few producers would have to over-
come additional hurdles to application. A plaintiff-favorable outcome in
Maine would appear unlikely.
3. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has maintained the tradi-
tional "substantial factor" requirements in multiple tortfeasor cases, though
it recognizes that the standard may be relaxed in appropriate cases, and
lower courts in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have been willing to
apply alternative and market share liability in limited circumstances. 69 The
Supreme Judicial Court in Payton v. Abbott Labs was "unable to give a
definitive answer," but held that it "might" be able to hold manufacturers
liable to a mother whose baby was physically harmed when the mother
took DES while pregnant.70  The court held that it could apply market
share liability, even though the plaintiff could not assure that the particular
company that produced the pills she took was named as a defendant. 71
Russo v. Material Handling Specialities Co. presented the superior
court with a similar legal question arising in painfully different circum-
stances. The plaintiff flight attendant in Russo lost his right testicle when a
rolling in-flight beverage tray, produced by one of two possible manufac-
turers, smashed into him. 72 He alleged that the accident occurred because
of the tray's negligent design and sale, and the companies' failure to warn,
and to honor warranties of merchantability. 73 The court denied the manu-
facturers' motion for summary judgment, and adopted the State of Wash-
ington's market share liability standard7 4  That standard requires that
69. Spencer v. Baxter Intl., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 74, 81 (D. Mass. 2001); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437
N.E.2d 171, 190 (Mass. 1982); Russo v. Material Handling Specialities Co., 4 Mass. L. Rptr. 288, 1995
Mass. Super. LEXIS 436, **21-23 (Aug. 29, 1995).
70. 437 N.E.2d at 190.
71. Id.; see Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1071-72 (for elements necessary to prove market share liabil-
ity).
72. 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 436 at *2.
73. Id. at**15-19.
74. Id.
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plaintiffs unable to identify the particular defendant that caused the harm
prove the following:
(a) that the plaintiff used the product; (b) that the product caused
the plaintiffs subsequent injuries; (c) that the defendant produced
or marketed the type of product used by the plaintiff, and (d) [that]
the defendant acted negligently in producing or marketing the
product. 5
Once applied, market share liability requires that the defendant prove that
the product was not in the area, relieving the plaintiff of the burden of
proving that it was.76 Russo also adopted the alternative liability theory,
shifting the burden of proving causation to multiple defendants who act
independently "when only one of them caused harm to the plaintiff and it is
impossible to identify the specific wrongdoer., 77 The court adopted the
theory as a means to prevent wrongdoers from escaping liability just be-
cause plaintiffs could not definitively identify them.78
In contrast, the district court in Spencer v. Baxter International, Inc. re-
jected alternative liability because the Massachusetts's Supreme Judicial
Court had previously rejected market share liability in Payton and consid-
ered the theory only appropriate for DES cases.79 Spencer also rejected the
alternative liability theory because it was not firmly established in the
Commonwealth. 80 In Spencer, the plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of their
deceased daughter, alleging that she was infected with the human immu-
nodeficiency virus ("HIV") by a blood clotting factor concentrate when she
was being treated for hemophilia; however, the plaintiffs could not be sure
that the manufacturer who developed the particular device causing the in-
fection was present in court. 81 The plaintiffs were thus unable to prove the
"more probable than not" burden of proof standard that any individual de-
fendant had caused the girl's death.82 Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to
present evidence about how each of the defendants made the factor concen-
trates that allegedly injured the girl, thus failing to establish that the defen-
dants engaged in "substantially the same conduct resulting in substantially
75. Id. at*16.
76. Id. The court argued that defining the market in the smallest possible geographic region would
increase the likelihood that liability would be imposed only on those defendants who actually caused
harm. Id. at * 18.
77. Id. at **20-22 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. 163 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
80. Id. at 80-81 (notwithstanding the other Superior Court's ruling in Russo, 1995 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 436 at **21-23).
81. Id. at 77-78.
82. Id. at 78.
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the same risk of harm.,8 3 Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to join all pos-
sible defendants involved in the procedure, they could only show that the
defendants probably caused the harm through "naked statistical proof," and
were unable to rule out other possible causes.
84
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has maintained traditional
"substantial factor" causation requirements, while the Commonwealth's
lower courts have conflicted over whether and when to adopt the alterna-
tive causation requirements in market share and alternative liability theo-
ries. There is little likelihood of convincing the Massachusetts Supreme
Court to relax its causation requirements in multiple polluter cases, unless
a plaintiff can show that: (1) all possible defendants are present; (2) each
defendant acted tortiously; (3) it is difficult or impossible for the plaintiff
to identify which specific tortfeasor is responsible for causing the harm; (4)
the nature of the harm each caused was substantially the same; (5) what-
ever harm the plaintiff suffered was actually caused by the polluters and
not other actors (or nature, genetics, etc.); and (6) it would create greater
injustice to disregard the suit than permit it. Considering its past reticence
to apply market share liability to cases other than DES cases, its strict stan-
dards for "substantial similarity" of harm, and its failure to formally adopt
alternative and market share liability standards, it would be difficult for
plaintiffs in the hypothetical scenario above to sustain a case before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
4. New Hampshire
While New Hampshire has expressly adopted indivisible injury rules
as they relate to damages, the state has thus far rejected alternative liability
theories to prove causation. 85 In Trull v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., a
family sued Volkswagen for design defects after one child died and two
more family members suffered severe brain injuries in an accident.8 6 The
two children were wearing their lap belts, but the family alleged that their
Vanagan was not crashworthy because it had inadequate seat belts and
lacked sufficient protection in cases of frontal impact.87 The court held
that plaintiffs may only establish proximate cause if the cause is a substan-
83. Id. at 79-80.
84. Id. The two manufacturers may have had different methods of screening blood donors, testing
and treating their products, and warning of risks. The use of naked statistical proof fails to "create
'actual belief' in the truth of the proposition to be proved." The court recognized limited circumstances
when statistical proofs may be used, but this case was not one of them. Id.
85. U. Sys. of N.H. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640, 653-55 (D.N.H. 1991); Trull v. Volks-
wagen ofAm., Inc., 145 N.H. 259, 267 (2000).
86. 145 N.H. at 260.
87. Id.
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tial factor in bringing about the harm, and the harm would not have oc-
curred without that conduct.88
In design cases, however, the court held that "the plaintiff need not
show that the defendant's design was the sole or dominant cause of the
injuries," merely that they were a substantial factor in increasing the inju-
ries over and above what they would have been otherwise.89 Once the
plaintiff proves causation in indivisible injury defective design cases, the
burden of proof shifts, and the defendants are required to apportion the
damages among themselves. 90 Otherwise, the innocent plaintiff would be
burdened with the almost impossible task of dividing fault, and, as the
court recognized, it is better to so burden the tortfeasors. 9!
When the plaintiff in University System of New Hampshire v. United
States Gypsum Co. sued United States Gypsum Co. and several other as-
bestos-containing product manufacturers for the costs and damages associ-
ated with removing asbestos from several of its buildings, the United States
District Court for the District of New Hampshire rejected the university's
alternative liability, enterprise liability, and market share liability claims as
inappropriate to asbestos claims.92 New Hampshire had not previously
recognized the alternative liability theory and the district court refused to
apply the theory in this case because the plaintiff could not name every
possible tortious defendant who could have caused the harm.93 The court
further noted that the theory should apply to cases where the defendants'
actions created "a substantially similar risk of harm," and not where differ-
ent types of asbestos-containing products are used in various quantities,
thus creating dissimilar levels of risk.
94
Moreover, University System rejected the market share theory, particu-
larly in asbestos cases, since asbestos is not a single identical product, and
thus does not cause identical harms or have identical effects, as market
share products should.95 Additionally, the court refused to apply the enter-
prise liability theory, reasoning that it should be imposed only "when
88. Id. at 264.
89. Id. at 264-65.
90. Id. at 265, 267.
91. Id. at 265-66.
92. U. Sys., 756 F. Supp. at 643, 654-55. University's asbestos claim, involving an action against
multiple producers of relatively similar, harmful products, is factually similar to multiple pollutants
cases but not identical. The case also included a succinct overview of New Hampshire law regarding
several alternative causation theories. Because asbestos cases are not factually identical to other multi-
ple pollutant cases, however, one should be wary of too confidently drawing conclusions from the case.
93. Id. at 653-55.
94. Id. at 654-55.
95. Id. at 655-56 (The court notes that, though the theory has been applied to drug cases, many
courts have refused its application there. Additionally, most have refused to apply it to asbestos
cases.).
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manufacturers are few in number, are jointly aware of the risks, and jointly
have the capacity to reduce or affect those risks, such as operating through
a trade association., 96 Though appropriate in cases where there are only
five or ten producers, the theory is inappropriate in a decentralized industry
with hundreds or thousands of smaller producers.97
In each instance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court and the United
States District Court, interpreting New Hampshire law, refused to expand
New Hampshire's alternative causation theories. The Supreme Court
showed a willingness to apply indivisible injury concepts to damage as-
sessment, and recognized that burdening plaintiffs to divide fault may in
some circumstances be both impossible and unfair. It reaffirmed, however,
its "substantial factor" standards for causation. For its part, the district
court refused to expand causation theories to asbestos cases.
While New Hampshire courts may treat multiple air or water polluters
similarly, it is unlikely that they will embrace any lowered standard for
causation. To justify a change, the courts will have to find, at least, that (1)
all potential tortfeasors are joined in the action; (2) the harm is produced
by extremely similar products; (3) the defendants are all part of a small,
controlling, insular community of producers; and (4) as a matter of policy
it would be unfair to burden the innocent plaintiff with impossible stan-
dards of proof while allowing wrongdoers to take no responsibility.98 Ab-
sent these factors, a pro-plaintiff judgment would seem unlikely.
5. Rhode Island
Rhode Island courts find causation where several possible causes occur
concurrently and cause a single harm. 99 In special circumstances, courts
may permit causes of action even when many years have passed between
the injury and the suit, so long as the defendant only recently discovered
the harm.'00 Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories held that a mother and eleven
daughters who discovered the ill effects of DES years after their exposure
to the drug could still sue the drug manufacturers, since some injuries only
reveal themselves years later. 0 1 In Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, a
woman suffered a severe avulsion of the little finger when her ring caught
on a girder as she retrieved her tennis ball; the Rhode Island Supreme
96. Id. at 656-57.
97. Id.
98. See supra. nn. 86-97 and accompanying text.
99. See Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, 502 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I., 1986); Anthony v. Abbott
Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43, 46 (R.I., 1985); Totman v. A. C. & S., 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 23, at **I 1-
12 (Feb. 11, 2002).
100. Anthony, 490 A.2d at 46-47.
101. Id.
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Court stated that proximate cause "need not be the sole and only cause."',0 2
It may occur with other causes that also contribute to the injury and still be
proximate, so long as the other causes do not intervene to such a degree
that they render the original negligent conduct "totally inoperative as a
cause of the injury."' 03 In Totman v. A. C. & S., Inc., Mr. Totman alleged
that General Electric's marine turbines contributed to his asbestos exposure
and related illnesses.'04 The court confirmed its Hueston holding, stating,
[I]t is for a jury to determine whether the GE product was a sub-
stantialfactor in causing Mr. Totman's illness. While there may be
several possible causes of Mr. Totman's alleged injuries, a proxi-
mate cause need not be the sole and only cause if it concurs and
unites with some other cause which, acting at the same time, pro-
duces the injury.'0 5
Rhode Island courts would probably consider multiple tortfeasor pollu-
tion cases using traditional substantial factor standards. Anthony indicates
that the courts may find valid causation despite the passage of years be-
tween the onset of the polluters' actions and the discovery of the negative
effects by a plaintiff years later.10 6 Hueston establishes that the courts are
not averse to combining independent but concurrent actions to find proxi-
mate cause. 0 7 In upholding Hueston, however, Totman also confirms that
Rhode Island courts apply the substantial factor test to determine causation
in cases involving more than one possible tortfeasor or cause of injury. 0 8
Beyond this, it is difficult to say how Rhode Island courts would consider
the hypothetical scenario above involving multiple polluters and an indi-
vidual suffering an indivisible, health-related injury. In the absence of
decisions specifically considering alternative standards to prove causation,
any argument to extend causation would have to be made on a policy basis,
and on the basis of previous case law from other states, like Michie and
Landers.
6. Vermont
Vermont has a traditionally held that when several, uncoordinated par-
ties combine to produce a single, indivisible injury that would not have
102. 502 A.2d at 828, 830.
103. Id. at 830.
104. 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 23 at *1.
105. Id. at ** 11-12 (emphasis added) (citing Hueston, 502 A.2d 827).
106. See 490 A.2d 43.
107. See 502 A.2d 827.
108. See 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 23.
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occurred but for their concurrence, the parties may be joined in litigation,
and each party may be found causally responsible for the entire injury. 0 9
The courts have not held, however, that standards of causation should be
relaxed in such circumstances, or in any other. 10 In Sharon v. Anahma
Realty Corp., one corporation built a dam across a river, and another cor-
poration subsequently built higher piers on which ice flow jammed, caus-
ing the obstructed waters to damage highways."' Sharon held that both
parties could be held jointly liable, since the harm could not have taken
place without both parties' actions." 2 The court reasoned that though each
of the actions separately would have been innocuous, since the injury could
only have resulted from a combination of the defendants' actions, the de-
fendants could be joined in chancery, and both be held liable." 3 Likewise,
when a negligent driver hit a boy after sliding on street ice caused by a
leaking water pipe that the city negligently failed to repair, Wagner v.
Waterbury held that both the driver and the city could be held responsible
for the entire injury.' 14
Whenever the separate and independent acts or negligence of sev-
eral persons, by concurrence, produce a single and indivisible in-
jury which would not have occurred without such concurrence,
each is responsible for the entire result, and they may be sued
jointly or severally, at the election of the party injured. In such
cases, the act or neglect of each is a proximate and an efficient
cause, and when several proximate causes contribute to an injury,
and each is an efficient cause, without the operation of which the
injury would not have been caused, it may be attributed to any or
all of such causes. This has come be the established doctrine of
this Court." 5
While the Vermont Supreme Court firmly established an indivisible in-
jury rule in the sense that uncoordinated parties can be held jointly respon-
sible if their otherwise innocuous actions combine to cause injury, the
court at no point expressly relaxes causation requirements beyond this con-
cession. Vermont has not expressly adopted alternative liability, market
share liability, or any other variations in causation requirements. Each of
the preceding decisions involved, at most, two or three responsible parties,
109. See e.g. Wagner v. Waterbury, 109 Vt. 368, 376-77 (1938); Sharon v. Anahma Realty Corp., 97
Vt. 336, 338 (1924).
110. See e.g. Wagner, 109 Vt. at 377; Sharon, 97 Vt. at 339-40.
111. 97 Vt. at 337-38.
112. Id. at338-40.
113. Id. at 338.
114. 109 Vt. at 370-71, 376-77.
115. Id. at 376-77.
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and required that each responsible party be an "efficient" cause. One may
argue that the court's willingness to hold responsible parties whose unco-
ordinated actions combined to create harm indicates that there is prece-
dence for holding multiple polluters responsible. Perhaps so, but only if
the causal field can be limited to several parties, each of which individually
contributed an "efficient," or substantial, cause to the harm. To infer more
from previous case law would be unfounded.
V. A SYNTHESIS OF THE STATE OF THE LAW IN NEW ENGLAND
Generally speaking, the plaintiff in the above scenario' 16 will need a lot
of luck and an excellent advocate to win. New England state courts have
relatively consistently refused to liberalize causation requirements, and
adopt any of a variety of alternative techniques, including alternative liabil-
ity, market share liability, enterprise liability, or indivisible injury rules as
applied in both Michigan and Texas." 7 A number of New England states
have long embraced the concept of indivisible injury as a way to more
fairly allow indivisible plaintiffs to sue multiple defendants, but only as the
concept relates to damages. 18 While courts in the region have considered
the theoretical value of lowering the standards of causation to benefit
plaintiffs suing multiple tortfeasors, 19 none of the states' supreme courts
have been willing to take the leap.
Though the New England states are united in their relatively conserva-
tive causation standards, they vary by matters of degree. Connecticut
adopts indivisible injury language for damage assessment, but it adheres
most strictly to traditional causation requirements of all the states in the
region. Not far behind, Vermont has long supported indivisible injury
principles as they relate to damages, but has never expressly relaxed causa-
tion requirements under any alternative theory.
At the opposite end, Massachusetts' lower courts are split over whether
to adopt alternative and market share liability theories, which indicates
some willingness within the state's court system to adopt novel causation
theories. Similarly, a federal district court, applying Maine law in Kinnett,
indicated that alternative liability made the most sense in cases of delayed
effects, or technological impediments to tracing producers, circumstances
that would likely be present in the hypothetical pollution scenario posited
116. Supra pt. I.
117. Seesuprapt. IV.
118. See e.g. supra pt. IV(B) (discussion of Saracyn Corp., 138 Conn. 69; Swan, 434 A.2d 1008; U.
Sys. of N.H., 756 F. Supp. 640; Sharon, 97 Vt. 336).
119. See e.g. supra pt. IV(B) (discussion of Kinnett, 716 F. Supp. 695; Payton, 437 N.E.2d 171).
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above.1 20 Therein lies the hope, but it must be balanced against the knowl-
edge that Maine courts have only contemplated, at most, several manufac-
turers as defendants.
The lack of on-point case law in Rhode Island involving multiple pol-
luters, indivisible injuries, or alternative causation theories makes it diffi-
cult to know where to place Rhode Island on any continuum.' 2' Finally,
the analysis of New Hampshire law in Trull and University System indi-
cates that though the state may consider alternative causation theories, it
will adopt them only when the circumstances of the case precisely fit
within the elements of a preexisting alternate causation theory, such as
alternative liability or market share liability, and the inequities that might
result from failing to adopt the change are compelling.
1 2
VI. THE RATIONALE FOR NEW ENGLAND STATES TO RELAX STANDARDS
OF CAUSATION FOR INDIVISIBLE INJURY CASES INVOLVING
MULTIPLE POLLUTERS
An advocate will have to appeal to two factors to argue that the States
should alter existing causation law to improve conditions for plaintiffs su-
ing multiple source polluters: (1) other states' case law and (2) public pol-
icy benefits.
A. Other States' Case Law
It is neither impossible nor unreasonable to revisit and amend causa-
tion requirements. Hundreds of cases in a variety of states involving mul-
tiple polluters and manufacturers of dangerous products illustrate that
courts can readily adopt different liability and causation theories without
upsetting their legal foundations. 123 As discussed above, those alternative
theories have taken a variety of different forms and names, including but
not limited to alternative liability, market share liability, enterprise liabil-
ity, and combinations of those three.
120. See supra pt. IV(B)(2) (Kinnett discussion).
121. It may be that the lack of on-point case law, not only in Rhode Island but throughout New Eng-
land, indicates that such cases are dismissed at early stages of the trial process. Any such conclusion,
however, would constitute pure conjecture on the author's part.
122. See supra pt. IV(B)(4).
123. See e.g. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 359-60, 371-74, 378; Summers, 199 P.2d at 1-2; Michie, 495 F.2d
at 215-17; Collier, 372 So. 2d at 290-94; Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1071-72; Landers, 248 S.W.2d at
734-35. See also Cetrulo, supra n. 13 (for hundreds more examples and a variety of different causation
theories).
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Applied strictly, none of the three fits multiple-source pollution cases
perfectly. Alternative liability, for example, requires that all responsible
parties be at trial, and plaintiffs may not be able to say with 100% cer-
tainty, for example, that air particles that have traveled distances to their
land and lungs came from one among a specifically limited field of power
producers. 24 Courts generally apply enterprise liability only in cases in-
volving inherently dangerous products and few possible manufacturers.
125
Carbon dioxide produced as a byproduct of an unknown number of power
stations may not be considered sufficiently "toxic," nor the field limited
enough, to apply this toxic tort theory. Likewise, market share liability
requires that the manufacturers have produced identical products that cause
identical injuries. 126 Here, the agricultural runoff, particulate emissions, or
other industry-wide discharges that cause indivisible harms may be similar,
but not identical, and may cause a variety of different indivisible injuries.
From each of these alternative theories, however, we gain models for
adaptation. There is no reason that New England courts could not further
adapt these alternatives, taking some pieces from traditional theories and
others from more progressive ones, to craft an alternative causation theory
specifically designed to provide the greatest degree of justice possible
given the scenario above. Decisions in Michigan, Texas, and other states
have shown us how. 127 Tradition, after all, is a poor excuse for injustice.
B. Public Policy Benefits
Courts will certainly rely in part upon judicial precedent throughout
the country to adopt any changes in causation requirements. Any argument
for change, however, should equally draw upon policy concerns. Air and
water pollution pose particular problems of proof for plaintiffs, since they
are released and move over time and space in larger and not always pre-
dictable patterns and environments. 28 New England courts must ask the
124. See supra pt. II ("Background" discussion).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See e.g. City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1297 (N.D. Okla 2003) ("The
injury alleged herein is a single, indivisible injury - the eutrophication of the lakes from excess phos-
phorus loading. Under Oklahoma and Arkansas law .. where there are multiple tortfeasors and the
separate and independent acts of codefendants' concurred, commingled and combined' to produce a
single indivisible injury ... each defendant may be liable even though his/her acts alone might not have
been a sufficient cause of the injury."); Michie, 495 F.2d 213; Collier, 372 So. 2d 288; Landers, 248
S.W.2d 731.
128. For an excellent discussion of new technological and legal methods to more accurately track and
determine legal responsibility for pollution from multiple sources, see Anna M. Michalak, Environ-
mental Contamination with Multiple Potential Sources and the Common Law: Current Approaches and
Emerging Opportunities, 14 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 147 (2002).
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question "[i]s it better to punish the innocent plaintiff because, through no
fault of her own, she is unable to identify the exact tortfeasor who caused
her injury,129 or to burden a group of defendants who acted to some degree
tortiously? '1
30
The courts need to be mindful of the role of torts litigation in protect-
ing individuals, their property, their health, and their environments. While
citizens may have other forms of redress (Le. through government regula-
tions or legislative action), in some cases they may not. In depriving the
injured plaintiff of the opportunity to sue for damages because of the tech-
nical difficulties of assuring that every possible defendant is present, be-
cause they are unable to prove the exact degree to which any of the defen-
dants contributed to their injury, or because any of the defendant's actions
individually would not have caused the harm, New England courts are de-
priving their citizens of an essential means to check and balance industrial
activity and to protect their communities from harm. The courts must real-
ize that as pollutants continue to fill our skies, soil, and water, the process
of proving their precise pathways and quantities remains difficult. In the
meantime, plaintiffs suffer harm. The courts cannot change the patterns of
the wind or the currents of the water, but they can change their causation
standards to better incorporate more technically and environmentally com-
plex litigation.
VII. A PROPOSAL TO SHAPE NEW ENGLAND MULTIPLE POLLUTER
INDIVISIBLE INJURY LAW
Let us begin with some obvious considerations, dangers, and difficul-
ties. Changing existing law to encourage a fairer administration of justice
risks that the new legal standard will have unintended consequences be-
yond the courts' consideration. In liberalizing causation law to more fairly
deal with multiple source pollution cases, courts have a responsibility to
protect the rights and interests of defendants both within and outside the
context of the negligence and nuisance pollution cases. The courts' goal
should be to tweak traditional causation just enough in certain specific
circumstances, to restore a greater sense of balance and justice between the
parties in multiple source pollution cases, while avoiding creating greater
injustice elsewhere.
The most difficult task in creating an alternative causation analysis for
negligence or nuisance cases involving multiple source pollution is defin-
129. (and the exact percentage of damage that each tortfeasor caused)
130. See Michie, 495 F.2d at 216; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 433B cmt. d.
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ing its borders and limitations. The very nature of pollution and the envi-
ronment make determining cause-in-fact difficult. A variety of disparate
actors have polluted and will continue to pollute the air, water, and soil
over long periods of time. Pollutants may take years to accumulate, and
injuries may take further years to develop. Many of the small particles
causing injury move through the atmosphere and other media in patterns
that are difficult or impossible to precisely track. Exposure to the pollut-
ants may have disparate effects upon similarly situated plaintiffs. Finally,
there are so many potential sources to cause environmental or health inju-
ries' 3 that any system must include a means to fairly account for other
possible factors that contribute to the plaintiffs injury. 132
Thankfully, other courts have taken the lead, and New England could
easily develop a framework to deal with these issues by adopting the lan-
guage and rationales in their law. 33 Combining elements from several of
the alternative causation theories and cases above, any new indivisible
injury causation rule should be restricted by the following guidelines:
(1) As a matter of policy and law, it is better to burden the defen-
dants, who have committed some degree of tortious act, than the
innocent plaintiff, to prove the precise degree of injury that each
defendant contributed to causation.
(2) The indivisible injury rule applies to causation, in addition to
damages.
(3) As a threshold matter, to pursue an indivisible injury lawsuit
against joined defendants in an industry, 134 the court or jury must
131. For example, did the plaintiff develop asthma from the gases coming out of the coal plant in a
neighboring town? From the cars on the highway next to her home? From the paper factory just up the
jet stream in Vermont? From the cigarette smoke at the bar in which she works? From her genetic
disposition?
132. When a variety of sources potentially cause an injury, from the plaintiff's smoking habits to a
genetic disposition, courts and juries have demonstrated that they are capable of considering compli-
cated and layered causal arguments. See e.g. supra nn. 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing
Totman, 2002 R.I. Super. LEXIS 23 at **I 1-12 (holding in an asbestos exposure case that the jury
could "determine whether the GE product was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Totman's illness.
While there may be several possible causes of Mr. Totman's alleged injuries, a proximate cause need
not be the sole and only cause if it concurs and unites with some other cause which, acting at the same
time, produces the injury.")).
133. See e.g. supra pt. IV(A).
134. Specifying that plaintiffs may only join defendants within an industry (or with "extremely simi-
lar" products or byproducts, see infra element (4)) theoretically limits the types of cases that can be
brought, so that individuals can not bring enormously complicated suits against, e.g., car manufactur-
ers, coal power plants, and cigarette producers all at once. Courts may discover occasions, however,
when it is appropriate to allow suits of multiple polluters in different industries when the actions of
those producers combine uniquely to cause indivisible injuries, or are bound factually by other factors.
Such decisions should be left to the discretion of the courts. See e.g. Oakwood Homeowners, 77 Mich.
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be able to find that the combined contributions of all of the poten-
tial defendants could have contributed "substantially" to the plain-
tiff s injury.'3 5
(4) Plaintiffs may join polluter-defendants in suits either if the pol-
luters' harm-causing products or byproducts are extremely similar,
or if they work together to create one indivisible harm. Defendants
need not have acted concurrently nor in concert to be joined in an
action.
(5) Plaintiffs need not join every possible defendant, but must
make an effort to join all potentially responsible parties within an
industry. If the plaintiffs fail to name a party that defendants argue
should be named, defendants are free to join that party to the suit.
(6) Any individual defendant's contribution to the injury need not
be sufficient to have independently produced the plaintiffs injury
in order for the defendant's actions to be considered causal.
(7) When defendants' specific contributions to the injury can be
reasonably determined through accepted means, they must be.
When this is not possible, all defendants will be held jointly and
severally liable.
(8) When the court lacks evidence of particular contributions to the
plaintiffs injury, it may choose to apportion polluters' causal and




Any decision by New England courts to adopt guidelines similar to
those above in cases where multiple polluters contribute to an indivisible
injury would have several positive effects. It would reestablish balance in
App. at 202-03, 217-21, discussed supra pt. IV(A)(1), in which plaintiffs sued four companies in unre-
lated industries for their indivisible contributions to pollution.
135. For an example of the "substantial" contribution rule, see e.g. Purcell v. Asbestos Corp., 153 Or.
App. 415, 424-25 (1996) (holding that when the plaintiff cancer victim was exposed to airborne asbes-
tos from different sources over 35 years, the court should inquire whether the defendants substantially
contributed to the plaintiffs injuries).
136. Similar to a market share theory, courts can allocate causal responsibility to polluters based not
on the market percentage of their output of goods, but rather on the market percentage of their output of
pollutants. For example, if the court finds a group of ten defendant power plants 40% causally respon-
sible for the plaintiff's asthma, and one of the ten plants produced 20% of the total regional pollutant
output, that defendant would be held 8% causally responsible for the injury (and damages).
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negligence and nuisance litigation by recognizing the complicated methods
by which citizens are injured by polluters, and incorporating methods to
accommodate just claims for injury that today would be denied. It would
empower citizens to challenge tortfeasors in court and protect their essen-
tial health, well-being, and their local environments. It would act to deter
polluters from negligent actions, and encourage them to act responsibly
and encourage cleaner, safer production methods rather than risk increased
litigation costs. Finally, it would more appropriately balance the burden in
society onto parties responsible for pollution-related injuries, and take
some of that burden off the innocent, injured plaintiff.
